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" gAlguna duda, ingeniero?
ZMe van a enmarrocar?...
No, eso no ocurrird"
ATURDAY, September 22 of 2007, 5:12 p.m., Peruvian time. After
seven years of exile, Alberto Fujimori, Peru's strongman president
from 1990 to 2000, returns to Peru. 2 This historical event takes
place one day after the Chilean Supreme Court's long-anticipated deci-
sion granting the Peruvian government's request to extradite Mr.
Fujimori so that he can be prosecuted in Peru for claims of crimes against
humanity and corruption, which allegedly took place during his time in
office.3
Former President Fujimori's controversial career is an issue that has
divided the Peruvian opinion. To his supporters, Mr. Fujimori is the man
who saved Peru "from the twin evils of terrorism and economic col-
lapse."'4 Thus, he is remembered with gratitude by some of the Peruvian
population for "crush[ing] the Shining Path guerrillas, stabili[zing] the
economy' 5 by overcoming hyperinflation, and "buil[ding] schools and
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1. Registro Exclusivo: El Retorno y sus Efectos, CARETAS, Sept. 27, 2007, at 13, avail-
able at http://www.caretas.com.pe/Main.asp?T=3082&id=12&idE=744&idSTo=251
&idA=28891. Former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori's question asking if he
was going to be handcuffed was answered in negative by the Director of the Peru-
vian Police, General David Rodriguez, as Mr. Fujimori was boarding the plane
that would take him back to Peru. Id.
2. Id.
3. Fugitive Returned, ECONOMIST, Sept. 27, 2007, available at http://www.economist.
com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=549237&story-id=986
7439.
4. Fujimori's Controversial Career, BBC NEWS, June 25, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/americas/705482.stm.
5. Peru's Fujimori Plans a Comeback, ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 2005, available at http://
www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=54923
7&story-id=ElVDNVJNJ.
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clinics in remote Andean towns."' 6 "To his opponents, he is an authorita-
rian strongman who has ridden roughshod over the country's democratic
institutions in order to preserve his hold on power."'7 He is being ac-
cused, among other things, of autocratic rule, destruction of democratic
institutions, media manipulation, and the corrupt racketeering of
Vladimiro Montesinos, his closest aide. 8
The following article will examine former Peruvian President Alberto
Fujimori's controversial career, his exile in Japan and subsequent arrest
in Chile, his extradition process and subsequent return to Peru, and the
consequences of extradition for both Mr. Fujimori and the Peruvian
people.
II. FORMER PERUVIAN PRESIDENT ALBERTO
FUJIMORI'S GOVERNMENTS
It was the year 1990, and general elections were taking place in Peru;
the country was "on the verge of economic collapse and racked by politi-
cal violence" left by the first government of current Peruvian President,
Alan Garcia Perez.9 An agricultural engineer born to Japanese parents, 10
"Mr. Fujimori was a political unknown until weeks before the vote, in
which he surprisingly defeated the centre-right coalition candidate, the
author Mario Vargas Llosa." 1
Within weeks after his election, Fujimori began "implementing a radi-
cal programme of free-market economic reforms," such as "removing
subsidies, privatizing state-owned companies," and also "reducing the
role of the state in almost all spheres of the economy."' 2 These reforms
helped end "rampant hyperinflation" and "paved the way for sustained
economic growth in the second half of the nineties. ' 13 "Mr. Fujimori also
moved quickly to tackle the left-wing rebels whose 10-year insurgency
had caused thousands of deaths and brought the country to the brink of
chaos.' 4 Both accomplishments-victory over left-wing insurgents and
curbing hyperinflation-gave Mr. Fujimori great acceptance within the
Peruvian population.' 5 As a result, when he stood for re-election in
6. Id.
7. Fujimori's Controversial Career, supra note 4.
8. Peru's Fujimori Plans a Comeback, supra note 5.
9. Fujimori's Controversial Career, supra note 4.
10. As a point of interest, Mr. Fujimori's career started creating controversy when he
decided to run for office the first time. Although it was not publicly discussed until
years later, there were allegations among opposition members that Mr. Fujimori
could not have run for office at all because he was not even Peruvian, but Japa-
nese, and the Peruvian Constitution requires the President to have been born in
Peru: "In order to be elected as President it is required that the candidate be born
in Peru..." CONST. PERU 1993 Article 110, available at http://www.tc.gob.pe/leg
conperu/constitucion.html (emphasis added).






1995,16 he had an overwhelming victory over the opposing candidates.1 7
But there was always a dark side to Mr. Fujimori. Some parts of the
Peruvian population started to see Mr. Fujimori as an authoritarian who
was keen to abuse his executive power. For example, on April 5, 1992,
with support of the military, Mr. Fujimori "dissolved the Peruvian con-
gress and courts and seized dictatorial powers."18 This measure gave him
ample opportunity to rule freely without any or much opposition. 19 How-
ever, acts such as these were minimized by the media and the population
due to the accomplishments made by the government at the time, such as
the capture of the leader of the Shining Path, Abimael Guzman Reinoso,
which took place only a couple of months later.20 Additionally, Mr.
Fujimori's critics accused him of using authoritarian methods against his
democratic opponents. Critics specifically accused him of using the Peru-
vian Intelligence Service-led by his shadowy security adviser, Vladimiro
Montesinos2 t-"to intimidate and spy on political opponents. '22
As the election process for what would be a third period in office for
Mr. Fujimori approached, allegations that Mr. Fujimori, together with
Vladimiro Montesinos, was using dirty tricks to ensure his continuance in
power, increased. He was able to overcome "domestic and international
criticism of his election victory" 23 in the 2000 election process.2 4 How-
ever, everything began to unravel shortly after the elections "with the
16. "The Presidential mandate lasts for five years..." CONST. PERU 1993 Article 112,
available at http://www.tc.gob.pe/legconperu/constitucion.html.
17. Fujimori's Controversial Career, supra note 4.
18. Id.
19. Thanks to this measure, Mr. Fujimori was able to trade a Peruvian Congress in
which he had a marked opposition for a new congress in which his political group
Cambio 90 was a majority. This political move allowed him to enact a new Consti-
tution in 1993 that permits presidential re-election, which the previous Constitu-
tion of 1979 did not permit, and pass legislation with almost no opposition. For
example, in terrorism matters, he was able to pass legislation which ignored due
process warranties, such as unlimited detention, military procedures, etc.
20. On September 12, 1992, Peruvian police forces accomplished what was later de-
fined by the media as "la captura del siglo" (the capture of the century): arresting
Abimael Guzman Reinoso, founder and most important person of the Shining
Path organization, with three other members of high influence within the organiza-
tion. This capture represented, in principle, the beginning of the end for the Shin-
ing Path.
21. To know more about Vladimiro Montesinos see Montesinos: The End of the Road,
BBC NEWS, June 24, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2hi/americas/1405548.stm; Javier
Farje, The Charges Against Montesinos, BBC NEWS, June 25, 2001, http://newsvote.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1407621.stm.
22. Fujimori's Controversial Career, supra note 4.
23. Fujimori: Decline and Fall, BBC NEWS, Sept. 18, 2000, http:llnewsvote.bbc.co.ukl2/
hi/americas/1031752.stm.
24. For example, the opposition alleged that the Peruvian Constitution of 1993, en-
acted when Mr. Fujimori was in office, only allowed one re-election process, so
Mr. Fujimori was forbidden from running for a third period (Mr. Fujimori, at the
time of the presidential elections in 2000, has been president for two periods al-
ready: 1990-1995 and 1995-2000). However, Mr. Fujimori argued that because the
Constitution of 1993 was enacted after he was elected President of Peru for the
first time in 1990, the first election process under said Constitution took place in
1995, and the 2000 election would be his first and only re-election process under
the 1993 constitution.
2008]
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broadcast of one short video tape."'25 The tape, obtained by the opposi-
tion, showed powerful intelligence chief, Vladimiro Montesinos, "appar-
ently bribing an opposition member of congress. '26 The video shocked
Peru.27 It not only represented the first piece of "evidence of potential
criminal activity" 28 against Mr. Fujimori and his closest aid Mr. Montesi-
nos, but also represented the decline of the regime of Mr. Fujimori. Af-
ter the video was published, Mr. Montesinos was forced to evade the
authorities, but he was later imprisoned and is now serving a twenty year
jail sentence in a Peruvian jail. 29 On the other hand, after the scandal,
Mr. Fujimori called new elections and abstained from participating, and
fled to Japan. From there, he submitted his formal resignation, via fax, to
the Peruvian Presidency. 30 Mr. Fujimori was exiled in Japan for five
years, protected from extradition by the Japanese government because of
his dual citizenship: Peruvian and Japanese.31
III. THE CHARGES: CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
AND CORRUPTION
Mr. Fujimori's governments were marked with several human rights
violations as well as cases of corruption. The Peruvian government based
its extradition request on a number of charges of criminal activity, such as
embezzlement, fraud, kidnapping, murder, and organized crime.32 The
most severe charges included violations of human rights in two particular
cases: the Barrios Altos massacre and the La Cantuta killing.33 The Bar-
rios Altos massacre took place in November 1991 in the neighborhood of
Barrios Altos, Lima, Peru. At a neighborhood barbeque, which the intel-
ligence service believed was to raise funds for the Shining Path, several
men later identified as members of Grupo Colina (Colina Group), a
death squad group made up of members of the Peruvian armed forces,
killed fifteen people, including an eight year old.34 The La Cantuta kill-
25. Fujimori: Decline and Fall, supra note 23.
26. Id. In the video Vladimiro Montesinos is shown giving a packet, apparently U.S.
$15,000.00, to opposition congressman Luis Alberto Kouri to "switch sides and
thereby give the government a majority in parliament". See The Video that
Shocked Peru, BBC NEws, Nov. 22, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/930
613.stm.
27. The Video that Shocked Peru, supra note 26.
28. See Id. See also Montesinos: The End of the Road, supra note 21 (stating that Mr.
Montesinos left behind some 700 Vladi Videos); Fujimori: Decline and Fall, supra
note 23.
29. Fugitive Returned, supra note 3.
30. Fujimori: Decline and Fall, supra note 23.
31. Fugitive Returned, supra note 3. It is important to notice that it is a recognized rule
in international law that extradition is denied when the accused is a national of the
requested State. See Marjorie M. Whiteman, 6 DiG. INT'L L. 728 (1968).
32. Fugitive Returned, supra note 3.
33. Patricia Caycho, Silo Extraditan ... tIsta es la Llave, iY Si No?, CARETAS, Sept.
13, 2007, at 13 available at http://www.caretas.com.pe/Main.asp?T=3082&id=12&
idE=742&idSTo=287&idA=28653.
34. COMISION DE LA VERDAD Y RECONCILIACION, HATUN WILLAKUY: Versi6n
Abreviada Del Informe Final De La Comisi6n De La Verdad y Reconciliaci6n,
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ing took place in July 1992 and involved the kidnapping and subsequent
murder of nine students and a professor from the University Enrique
Guzman y Valle, La Cantuta, a group that was also accused of terror-
ism 35 . The study by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission
found that due to the authoritarian methods used by Mr. Fujimori, such
crimes could not have been committed without the full knowledge and
approval of Mr. Fujimori and Mr. Montesinos. 36
Additionally, there are several allegations of corruption practices that
took place during Mr. Fujimori's governments. For example, Peruvian
prosecutors have discovered at least seventy bank accounts in Panama
and Switzerland to which Mr. Fujimori and Mr. Montesinos have alleg-
edly moved millions of dollars37. Another example is the existence of
"Vladi Videos," such as the one previously mentioned, in which Mr.
Montesinos appears to be bribing different members of opposition parties
in congress, 38 television stations executives, and newspaper executives to
ensure their support of the government. 39
IV. EXTRADITION PROCESS
When Former President Alberto Fujimori left his exile in Japan where
he was protected against extradition due to his double nationality and
flew to Chile, he took a gamble. 40 Mr. Fujimori was hoping that the sour
relationship that exists between Peru and Chile would stop the Chilean
authorities from cooperating with the Peruvian authorities to bring him
to justice.41 However, time would prove him wrong: he was arrested only
seventy hours after his arrival in Chile and the Chilean's Supreme Court
rejected his bail a day later.42
Mr. Fujimori's arrest by the Chilean authorities frustrated a comeback
strategy that started during his exile in Japan. There, he had created a
"virtual candidacy" through which he communicated with his supporters
in Peru via a radio program as well as through his web page.43 He also
"launched a new political party called Si Cumple ('Yes, he delivers')" and
Peru [Great Story: Abbreviated Version of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation
Commission Final Report], 321 (Navarrete S.A. Ed. 2004) (2004).
35. Id. at 320.
36. Id. at 321.
37. Fujimori: Decline and Fall, supra note 23.
38. Montesinos: The End of the Road, supra note 21.
39. Fujimori: Decline and Fall, supra note 23.
40. Will Chile Send Fujimori to Peru?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 5, 2006, available at http://
www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=54923
7&story-id=ElVPVJJDJ.
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"renewed his Peruvian voter-identification card." 44 The plan: try to se-
cure his followers as many spots as possible in the Peruvian Congress
during the 2006 elections so that he could then "offer their votes to the
next government in return for a clear run in 2011." 4 5 It is important to
mention that after Mr. Fujimori fled from Peru and submitted his resigna-
tion from Japan, the Peruvian Congress banned him from holding office
until the year 2011.46
Chile hosted additional advantages that caused Mr. Fujimori to assume
the risk of being detained. It had a geographic advantage over Japan; he
was closer to his followers. Also, regarding the extradition risk, Chile had
proven to be a safe haven for other former Latin American former presi-
dents who sought exile there. 47 For example, former Argentine President
Carlos Menem's extradition request by Argentina was denied by the
Chilean Supreme Court.48 However, he was only charged with corruption
claims and not with any human right violations.49 Although Peru and
Chile signed an extradition treaty in 1932,50 to secure his extradition, Pe-
ruvian's prosecutors would have to "offer evidence against Mr. Fujimori
sufficient to justify his indictment under Chilean law for a serious crime
that was not political. '51 For example, in the case of Fernando Calmell
Del Solar, a Peruvian newspaper owner accused of taking bribes from
Vladimiro Montesinos, the Chilean Supreme Court held that the charges
submitted by the Peruvian government for his extradition "did not
amount to a crime under Chilean law. ''52 It is important to notice that
under the principle of double criminality in international law, acts that
are extraditable are solely those "which are offenses under the laws of
both States and punishable by a certain minimum term of imprisonment"
in both States. 53
But Mr. Fujimori's case was weightier, it included claims of violations
against human rights as well as corruption claims, and the Peruvian pros-
ecutors did a better job. Additionally, the Chilean Supreme Court was
under pressure due to recent decisions in which it applied international
44. Id.




47. Will Chile Send Fujimori to Peru?, supra note 40.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Ratifica el Tratado de Extradicion entre Chile y el Peru, Firmado en Lima el 5 de
Novimbre de 1932 [Ratification of Extradition Treaty between Chile and Peru,
signed in Lima on November 5, 1932], available at http://www.oas.orgljuridico/
MLA/sp/traites/sp-traites-ext-chl-per.pdf.
51. Will Chile Send Fujimori to Peru?, supra note 40. A political exception is a recog-
nized principle in international law that forbids extradition where the requested
party can prove that the requesting party's only purpose for extradition is based on
political prosecution. Whiteman, supra note 31, at 728.
52. Will Chile Send Fujimori to Peru?, supra note 40.
53. Whiteman, supra note 31, at 728.
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law over domestic Chilean law.54 A clear example is the Chilean Su-
preme Court's decision in the prosecution of three Chilean police officers
accused of killing two members of the Revolutionary Movement in
1973.55 In that case the Chilean Supreme Court reversed a finding from
the lower court that held that those accusations of murder originated
under Chilean law.56 The Chilean Supreme Court held that the case was
one of crimes against humanity under international law.57 Additionally,
the Chilean Supreme Court was trying to clean up the bad reputation it
gained under the dictatorship era of former Chilean President Augusto
Pinochet. Thus, the Peruvian government was sure that the Chilean Su-
preme Court was going to extradite Mr. Fujimori; otherwise, the Court
would throw away its reputation for applying international law over do-
mestic law in cases of crimes against humanity. 58
Chile also had another reason to grant Peru's extradition request: to
mend its damaged relationship with its neighbor to the north. Mr.
Fujimori's arrival to Chile came at a time when the relations between
Peru and Chile were not at their best. Trade relationships between both
parties had been thriving: Chilean firms had invested in several areas of
the Peruvian economy, such as department stores and chemical produc-
tion, and Peruvian chefs ran some of the best restaurants in Santiago,
Chile's capital.59 However, the past continues to haunt both countries.
In the Pacific War in the late nineteen century, Chile defeated Bolivia
and its ally, Peru. As a consequence, Bolivia lost its outlet to the sea and
Peru lost what is now Chile's copper-rich territory.60 Bolivia continues to
negotiate with Chile for access to the sea, which has become more feasi-
ble due to the recent discovery of large natural gas reserves in Bolivia,
and the lack of natural resources in the Chilean territory.61 Peru, on the
other hand, disputes its southern maritime border. 62 Chile alleges that
the maritime border between the two countries is due west deep into Pe-
ruvian territory, whereas Peru argues that it lies southwest more into
Chilean territory; the dispute is significant because fish-rich triangle is in
the middle.63 Peru has responded by threatening to take the case to the
International Court of Justice of The Hague, a move that has not been
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welcomed by the Chilean government. 64 Thus, although relations be-
tween Mr. Garcia, Peru's President, and Ms. Bachelet, Chile's President,
have been ostentatiously friendly, such "[rielations could be upset if
Chile's Supreme Court thr[ew] out Peru's request to extradite Alberto
Fujimori. '' 65 It is important to remember that in the 1970s when both
countries were ruled by military governments, they came close to war.66
Regardless of all the reasons why the Peruvian government thought the
extradition of Mr. Fujimori was imminent, things did not start well for
them. Chilean Trial Court Judge Orlando Alvarez denied the extradition
request arguing that the Peruvian government had not submitted enough
evidence to prove Mr. Fujimori's culpability in the alleged crimes.67 On
appeal, Peruvian prosecutors argued that under international criminal
law the superior is responsible for crimes committed by his agents if it is
proved that he knew of such crimes, or was in a position where it was
reasonable to infer that he knew of such crimes and did not take the
necessary measures to prevent them and to sanction those responsible.68
Additionally, the Peruvian prosecutors cited article 365 of the Busta-
mante Treaty, signed by both parties in 1928, which established that the
requesting party only has to show indicios racionales de culpabilidad (rea-
sonable signs of culpability). 69 Thus, under the Bustamante Treaty, the
level of evidence required does not need to be absolute.
Before the Chilean Supreme Court decision was issued however, Mr.
Fujimori played his last card to try to avoid extradition: a bid to win a
seat in the upper house of Japan's parliament to gain political immunity
from extradition.70 He called himself "the last Samurai" in a campaign
video and pledged to use his "experience gained during 10 years in office
in Peru to help Japan solve its problems." 71 However, he failed to reach a
bid on the elections, a result welcomed by human right groups in Peru
who were pleased "Japanese people had not treated Mr. Fujimori with
impunity. '72
V. FINAL VERDICT
The Chilean Supreme Court granted the Peruvian government's extra-
dition request of former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori "based on
64. According to the Peruvian government, the complaint will be submitted by the end
of this year. See El Canciller Garcia Belaunde Afirma que la Demanda del Peru
ante la Corte de la Haya "Sera Impecable", El Comercio, http://www.elcomercio.
com.pe/ediciononline/HTMLJ2007-10 25/el-cancillergarcia_belaunde_a.html.
65. Neighbors But Not Yet Friends, supra note 59.
66. Id.
67. Caycho, supra note 54, at 34.
68. Id.
69. Id.





two charges of human right violations and five of corruption. ' 73 The two
human right charges included the death of fifteen people in the Barrios
Altos massacre and of ten people in the La Cantuta killing, both commit-
ted by a death squad group allegedly promoted by Mr. Fujimori. 74 The
corruption charges included embezzling about fifteen million U.S. dollars,
payoffs to members of congress, and illegal wiretapping.75 The Peruvian
government has assured that it will try Mr. Fujimori with all the warran-
ties of due process, including established principles in international law
such as the doctrine of specialty through which an "accused will not be
tried or punished for any offense previously committed other than that
for which his extradition is granted. '76
VI. THE FUTURE
The Peruvian Supreme Court's division specializing in criminal proce-
dures77 will be in charge of Mr. Fujimori's trial for the two human right
violation charges and five corruption charges. The first step according to
Peruvian prosecutors will be to formally notify Mr. Fujimori of the
charges of which he is accused. 78 Peruvian prosecutors estimate that a
final decision on Mr. Fujimori's case will be in 2008, but they recognize
that it will be a complicated trial, especially regarding the two charges of
human right violations. 79 Mr. Fujimori claims that he did not know the
doings of his spy chief, but Mr. Montesinos, who has been already found
guilty, will be a key figure in his trials.80 Prosecutors have also stated that
there are some other charges that remain pending that will be requested
of the Chilean authorities to be included under the extradition request so
that they can be used at trial, such as the killing in 1992 of about forty two
prisoners on a military operation in the Peruvian prison of Castro Cas-
tro.81 Mr. Fujimori's case is the first in which a former president has been
extradited to his country for charges of human right violations; according
to experts, Mr. Fujimori may be condemned up to thirty years in prison.8 2
Mr. Fujimori's detention in Lima is a risk that the Peruvian govern-
ment was prepared to assume. However, this situation may create some




76. Whiteman, supra note 31, at 728.
77. As a former head of state, Mr. Fujimori has to be tried by the Supreme Court.
78. La Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema Procesard a Fujimori por Cinco De-
litos, El Comercio, Sep. 22, 2007, http://www.elcomercio.com.pe/ediciononline/
HTMLolecportada/2007-0922/olecportada0425403.html.
79. La Procuraria Confia en que la Sentencia Contra Fujimori se Emita el 2008, El




82. Fujimori Estard Bajo un Regimen de Carceleria Residencial en la DINOES, El
Comercio, Sep. 23, 2007, http://www.elcomercio.com.pe/ediciononline/HTMLJ
olecportada/2007-09-23/olecportada0425404.html.
2008]
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complications for the current Peruvian President, Alan Garcia, who "has
relied for a legislative majority on the backing of Mr. Fujimori's support-
ers" led by Mr. Fujimori's daughter, Keiko Sofia Fujimori. 83 For exam-
ple, Mr. Fujimori's followers have already attempted to frustrate the
passing of legislation proposed by the executive branch, showing that
they still have enough power in congress to be considered an opposi-
tion.84 Mr. Fujimori's followers allege that their strategy will be to try to
victimize Mr. Fujimori, whereas the government will try the opposite.8 5
This situation may cause a division in several areas of the political envi-
ronment in Peru. Also, Mr. Fujimori's followers are pressuring congress
to impeach Peruvian Minister of Internal Affairs, Luis Alva Castro, des-
ignated by the executive, for alleged irregularities in the acquisition pro-
cess of 698 police patrols, and are therefore trying to cause political
instability among different sectors of the executive. 86
In conclusion, Mr. Fujimori's extradition is a big accomplishment for
the Peruvian government that now has the opportunity to try him under
its own laws for crimes he allegedly committed during his time in office.
However, the Peruvian Government has to treat this issue very carefully
because Mr. Fujimori still has many followers and people who owe him
favors in Peru. Only time will tell if the extradition process was the con-
sequence of a mistake made by a man whose custom was not to make
mistakes and who deceived a whole country for over a decade, or just
part of Mr. Fujimori's strategy to regain power in the next Peruvian elec-
tion by virtue of his renewed connection with his followers.
83. In an irony of history, in 1992 Mr. Garcia himself sought asylum in Colombia,
fearing corruption charges from Mr. Fujimori, which were later dropped. Fugitive
Returned, supra note 3.
84. Registro Exclusivo: El Retorno y sus Efectos, supra note 1, at 13.
85. Id.
86. Las Bancadas Parlamentarias no Deben Prestarse al Juego del Fujimorismo en la
Interpelaci6n a Alva Castro, El Comercio, Sep. 25, 2007, http://www.elcomercio.
com.pelediciononline/HTMLIolecportada2007-9-25olecportadaO425773.html.
